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Abstract
Health, Binge Drinking, and, Labor Market Success:
A Longitudinal Study on Young People
by
Shao Hsun Keng and Wallace E. Huffinan
Health, like schooling, is a form ofhuman capital and can be expected to be positively
related to labor productivity and labor supply. The production of good health and labor
productivity, however, sometimes competes with an individual's lifestyle, e.g., binge drinking.
In this study, an individual's health has three dimensions: current health status, binge drinking
which is an unhealthy lifestyle, and stature or mature height which is a young adult's health
endowment. This study presents and fits a dynamic model of an individual's demand for health,
demandfor binge drinking, labor supply, andwageor demandfor labor equationsto the NLSY
1979 cohort panel data ofyoimg people. We find that binge drinking has a negative but
insignificanteffect on the demand for health, an individual's good health and larger stature
increasehis/herwage and binge drinkingreduces it. An individual's good health and binge
drinking increase his/her labor supply. An individual's decision to bingedrinking is shownto
berational addiction which is forward looking (rather than myopic which ignores future impacts)
and to be highlyresponsive to the priceof alcohol in the longrun and to the legalminimum
drinking age. We also show thatlabor productivity of 1979 NLSY cohort ismost likely
6percent lower than earlier cohorts due to their higher frequency ofbinge drinking, shorter
stature, and lower educational achievement.
Key words: health, labor productivity, labor supply, binge drinkmg, youth, panel data, rational
addiction, human capital.
I. INTRODUCTION , . ,
Health, like schooling, is a form of human capital and can reasonably be expectedto be
related positively to labor productivity orwage rates and to labor supply. Most of thehuman
capital literature has, however,:focused on thebroad impacts of schooling and only gives
limited treatment to health., By obtaining a better understanding of the contribution of health
to labor.market success, wemight be,able to gain new. insights about the performance of labor
markets. For example, if;wage rates and health are positively related andwe can show that
some important dimensions of health status ofworkers declined during the 1970s andl980s,
thiswould provide newevidence about laborproductivity,and possible sources of some of the
decline in the rate of growthof real wage rates starting in 1973 and continuing through 1995.
Binge drinking among young.people, especially,teenagers and college students, has
increased dramatically since the late1.960s and, has drawn public attention because of its
association with negativesocial,outcomes~trafRc;accidents,(Zobeck et.al, 1994), campus
.violence (Grossman andMarkowitz, -199?), .unemployment (Mullahy and Sindelar, 1996), and
alcohol poisoning and mental health problems (National.Council ofAlcoholism and Drug _
Dependence; U.S. Dept. ofHealth and Human Semces). Binge drinking may have short-term
' health consequences which lower, labor productivjty because of..dehydration, exhaustion,
hangovers, etc, (but does not affect long-term health status) and long-term consequences
which lowers longTterm,health statusand.thereby labor^productiyity and laborsupply. These
are additional .private'and social costs of ,binge, drinking that seem^likely to occur. Thus,
knowledge ofthe nature and extent-of the linkbetween binge.drinlqng, health, and labor
market outcomes is important to public policy.
Stature, or height ofpre-adult individuals and mature height of adults, has become an
important health indicator recently (Strauss and Thomas 1998; Steckel 1995; Fogel 1994,
Fogel 1999; Fogel and Costa 1997). Height reflects investments made in an indiwidual
during childhood and heredity. Human growth seems to have flinctional consequences for
physical and mental development, health, personality, and personal appearance which have
been shown to affect labor productivity and (or) hours ofwork (Steckel 1995; Fogel 1994;
Strauss and Thomas 1998; Biddle and Hammermesh 1998). Also, height (and weight) at early
ages have predictive power for the on-set ofchronic diseases and premature mortality at
middle and late ages (Fogel 1999; Fogel and Costa 1997). Steckel (1995) shows that average
height ofU.S. adult, native bom, white males rose steadily for the 75 years before the birth
cohort of1955, but then it peaked and declined to 1965, being about 1percent below trend in
1965, before starting to increase again. Ifwe can better identify the effects ofstature on. labor
market outcomes, we will have added to the evidence ofreturns to investing in child health,
which is also an important public policy issue.
Young people face complex decisions on the allocation oftheir time to leisure
activities, including binge drinking, schooling, and working for awage, given their time and
young adult health endowments, and employers face complex decisions on employment
training and compensation ofworkers. Ifworkers' short- and long- term health status are
affected by binge drinking, these generally negative outcomes must be weighed against the
positive consumption benefits for rational'behavior. Furthermore, if binge drinking lowers
short- and long- term,labor productivity; this may have^important,feedback affects on labor
supply, idemand for binge drinking, and onotherxonsumption decisions., Hence, the economic
story of the relationship among health, binge drinking, and labormarket outcomes seems
likely to be a complex anddifficult one to disentangle.
.Grossman, ChaloupIka,-and Sirtalan (1998),have shownusing panel data for college
students that alcohol consumption is addictive in the rational addiction sense, .the long-run
..price elasticity^ of demand for alcohol (in. number of drinks per year), is significant and ,,
significantly-larger than the:short-run price elasticity, and a large ,hike. inthe Federal excise tax
on alcohol would cause a significant reduction in alcohol consumption of young people. They
also showed that a higherpriceof alcoholwould reducethe.ampunt<pfviolence committed by
college students. > . ^ ' • - : v , . •
' Althoughthe evidence for adverse impacts of problem drinking by an individual on his
or her human capital is abundant, the economic literature fails to reach a-consensus. Berger
and Leighl'(1988).showed that alcohol use has a negative impact on an individual's wage.,
Mullahy and.-Sindelar; (1993)-demonstrated that alcoholics earn less than their counterparts.
Hamilton'and Hamilton (1997) found a flatter age-eamings,profile for heavy drinkers than for
moderate drinkers or non-drinkers. In contrast, Heien (1996) andvFrench and Zarkin (1995)
found that moderate drinkersihave higher annual^earnings and hourly wages than others.
Cook,(1991) found that drinkers across the drinking spectrum earn about 10 percent more
than both lifetime and recent abstainers; .Kenkel and Ribar (1994) found a smalj negative
effect of heavydrinking on annual .earning for men-and no effect.forwomen.. Zarkin, French,
Mroz, andBray (1998) found no evidence of an inverse U-shaped relationship betweenan
individual's wage and intensity of alcohol usewhen other characteristics were controlled for.
The evidence from these studies suggests that cross-sectional data and least squares estimates
provide unreliable sources of evidence onthese complex relationships.
Theobjectives of this study are to present and fit a dynamic model of a young adult's
decisions on health, binge drinking, labor supply, and thewageor demand for his/her labor
services, andto develop policy implications from our results. Grossman's (1972a) investment
in health model andBeckerandMurphy's (1988) rational addiction model are combined and
modified. The hybrid model provides a rational framework for examining the individual's
optimal intertemporal decisions on leisure, alcohol consumption, and investments in health
under rational alcohol addiction. We take a semi-parametric approach, using a structural
econometric model and bootstrap standard errors. The empirical model contains four
structural equations—demand for health, demand for binge drinking, labor'supply, and wage or
labor demand. In contrast to most of the eariier studies, we employ a panel data set, the .
NLSY for the 1979 cohort. By using panel data for individuals, we have the potential to
identify some ofthe long-term consequences ofthese decisions on an individual s health,
binge drinking and hours ofwork. Of course, the oldest individuals in this panel are only in
their late thirties, so more long-term impacts can be expected as these individuals live out the
remainder oftheir lives. In our estimation procedure, we adjust for sample selection bias and
stochastic regressor bias. The primary estimation procedure is by instrumental variables, and
to develop some important new implications about excise taxes and minimum legal drinking
age, weconduct simulations ofshort- and long-term impacts on the key endogenous
variables-demand for binge driiiking, demand for health, thewage, and laborsupply.
Our empirical results suppbh the rational'addiction model~(predicted) lead and lag
binge 'drinking increases'the current demand for binge drinking, and show that when ayouth
starts to drink before age 18, his^er demand for binge drinking increases. We also find that
the demand for binge drinking is alcohol price elastic and that higher legal drinking age
significantly reduces the demand for binge drinking for under age youths. -For individuals
above the legal drinking ages,' thedemand for binge drinking shifts leftward as they age.
Binge drinking has no significant effect on the demand for health. Good health and a larger
stature have positive (significant) effects and binge drinking a negative effect on an
individual's wage. Both'good'health and binge drinking increase labor supply. However,- the
overall effect of increased binge drinking is to reduce earnings. We also provide an estimate
of thewage reductions for the 1979 cohort diie to shorter height, lower educational
achievement, andgreaterbinge drinking relative to earlier cohort^ -
n. Economic Model
Grossman (1972 ^b) lays out the foundation for research focusing on the demand for
' 'I' ; " . ^^ ;
health and medical care markets. Health is viewed as a stock of human capital in his model.
Health depreciates over time and can be increased or maintained by investing in health
production. The strength ofthis model lies in an individual's incentive to invest in his/her
health motivated by the physic and financial rewards generated from health production.
He/she can invest in health using medical care, his/her owntime, or market inputs. Many
personal habits directly tie to heaUh production. For example, routine exercise enhances
health, whereas binge drinking accelerates the depreciation ofhealth and can beviewed as a
disinvestment. However, Grossman's assumption that thewage is independent of health is
not supported by other studies (Berkowitz et al., 1983; Lee, 1982a; Luft, 1975). These
studies find that health is a key determinant of the wage.
Economists have long viewed harmful addiction as an irrational behavior. Alcoholics
are myopic, and they ignore the adverse consequences ofalcoholism when de^rmining
current alcohol consumption. This hypothesis implies that current consumption is mainly .
driven by addiction, which is determined by the level ofpast consumption. On the other hand,
Becker and Murphy (1988) model the consumption ofaddictive goods as rational behavior.
They propose that consumers take the consequences ofaddiction into account and make a
consistent plan to maximize utility. They present evidence offorward-looking behavior by
citing that the smoking rates ofmales aged 21 to 24 declined by more than one-third from
1964-1975. The decline is related to the first Surgeon General's report published in 1964,
which altered the public's perception of smoking risks.
The distinction between the myopic and the rational addiction model is that the
rational addiction model involves multi-period optimization while myopic model involves only
one-period decision-making. The rational addiction model has been tested empirically and the
results (Becker, Grossman, and Murphy, 1994; Chaloupka, 1991; Grossman, Chaloupka, and
I
Brown, 1995a; Grossman, Chaloupka, and Sirtalan, 1995b) support the hypothesis that
addictions are rational and are consistent with forward-looking maximization. =
Our"theoretical framework combines Grossman's demand for health and Becker and
Murphy's rational addiction model. "Let ayoung adult have the following utility function;
(1) U, = U[H„ D;, L,;Z,; D,.,.AGE,,He]. E>; > 0, t = .
Ht is thehealth capital at period t; Dt and Dn are thealcohol consumption at period t and t-1,
respectively. Dtis nonnegative indicating that for many individuals, they choose notto engage
inalcohol use. Ltrepresents the leisure at time t. Zt is thecomposite consumption good at
period t and its price is no^aiized.'AGEt'is the'individual's age at period t, and He is the
mature height of the individual.--The young adult lives T periods, then his/her stock ofhealth
falls below the minimum to sustain life and hence death occurs. Nonetheless, the
determination of longevity is not' considered in thecurrent model, i.e., to simplify,- T is fixed.
To capture the degree ofaddiction^ the reinforcement and tolerance effect of addiction
are incorporated into an individual's utility function in the following way: ^
(2)
UdjD, , >0 indicates that when he/she has higher past alcohol consumption, the marginal'
utility of current alcohol consumption is increased. j<6' captures the tolerance effect
showing that an individual's higher past alcohol consumption lowers'his/her current utility.
Combining both effects, the young adult must increase his/her rate of alcohol-consumption
over time to achieve the same utility level. • .
Although Becker and Murphy used the concept of"consumption capital," which is the
sum of each period's net alcohol consumption, to show the severity ofaddiction and assumed
the depreciation rate isbetween 0 and 1, we setthe depreciation rate to 1to ease the
estimationburden. As a result, the stock of consumption capital at period t is just the
consumption at period t-1. Moreover, the utility function is continuously difFerentiable and, at
each period t, the following conditions hold.
(3) Uh, >0, >0, >0, U,, >0, >0, U, <0,
i = H.D,L,Z; t = 0,l,2,...J . . ,
UpL >0 which implies that leisure and alcohol consumption are complements. The stock of
health capital follows thehealth capital accumulation equation:
(4) H,„={1-^[AGE,,D,,H,]}H,+I, .
Itis the gross investment (or health production) and (5[AGE(, Dj, H^] is the depreciation
rate, which is a function ofage, alcohol consumption, and height. Consistent with human
aging ofadults, the health depreciation rate increases with age_at an increasing rate. The
derivative ofthe depreciation rate with respect to the alcohol consumption is further assumed
to.be a constant. That is, =S^. = for i, j =0, 1, 2,... ,T and i j. The gross investment
inhealth is defined by the following health production function:
(5) I,=I[M,T^ED] ..
Mt is the medical input at period t, and ED is educational attainment, which is assumed to be
positively related to market and non-market productivity. The production ofhealth capital
often requires inputs other than medical care, such as own time input, T," . Medical input is
defined in a broader sense in the model. It includes not only4he actual spending in-medical
care, but also contains the use of health,information. The productionflinction is assumed to
be Cobb-Douglas and to have constant returns to scale. Therefore, the cost function of the
healthproduction can be expressed as: ^
(6) = . , . . . . „ . ^
where =;rP",Wi ;ED -denotes the unit-cost .9fproducing.It^ and P" is the price ofmedical
input. Here, we relaxed Grossman's independence assumption ontheeffect of health onlabor
productivity. The wage rate is assumed to bea function ofthe stock of health, the
.•'Mr,'.,. , !
consumption of alcohol, age, education, other personal characteristics, Qi and innate ability,
f- %
<I>:
(7) w,=w[H„D,,AGE,,ED.Q,;H„;0]
Furthermore, the relationship betweenthe wage and health, alcohol consumption, and
unobserved innate productivity are as follows:
Wh, >O.Wh^ >0/- . , , >
The individual faces time and asset accumulation constraints. The total time available
at each period is T. It is exhausted by all possible uses:
(8) T =Tj'^+Lj+T^", Tj"^ >0 , ,
where T* is hours worked, Lt is leisure time, and T" is the time input into the health
production. T* is nonnegative because some individuals choose not to participate in the labor
force, especially if they have major health problems. The lifetime budget constraint is
presented in terms of the full-income budget constraint:
(9) V(0) +2]b'Tw, =5]b'[;rJ^+WjLj +P°D^ +ZJ .
t=0 tsO
V(0) is the nonwage income atperiod 0, and b is a discount factor which equals where
r is a constant interest rate. Furthermore, the personal rate of time preference is assumed to
equal the interest rate. Finally, the lifetime utility maximization for a young adult is
summarized as follows:
MAX ^b' U[H„D„L„Z,; D,_,, AGE,, subject to equations (4) to (9).
The first-order conditions are
(10) K-
a. • i=l+1 j=i+l
T-1
j=t+1
(11) If n[l-<5j]H,
OD, ' i=i+l j=t+l
+A]b'T>o. -b"' i:b'^ ''yDW„,.T^:,n[l-<^jPiU^b' P° ,
i=l+1 j=l+l
D( > 0, and
D.^=0 .
^dD,
(12) ^:U,,-Xw, =0
dL.
T;" >0, and
10
T."(-U,,, +Xw.)=0 .
gA , ' 11(13) ^:U,,-A-=0 .
sz.
where Xis themarginal utility of initial wealth, V(0). It is assumed to be constant overtime.
The second and third terms'in equation (12) show thenecessaiy conditions for thecomer
solution of labor supply. ' ' . . ,
• The left-hand side ofequation (10)ms the discounted sum offuture benefits resulting
fi-om one additional unitof health investment at period t. These fiiture benefits include
increased satisfaction from improved health and higher labor productivity. The right-hand
side ofequation (10) is the discounted cost ofproducing one unit ofhealth capital. The
' J, '
young adult will invest in health to the point where the marginal cost equals its marginal
benefit.
Equation (11) is the equilibrium condition for the consumption ofalcohol. The right-
hand side is the discounted net benefits, which are the difference between the value of the
increased utility from the consumption atperiod t and the discounted fijture costs resulted
firom theadditional alcohol consumption. The sum ofthese discounted costs and alcohol price
represents the full cost ofalcohol consumption to the young adult. Equation (12) indicates
the marginal utility ofleisure equals the real wage. Equation (13) shows that the marginal
utility derived from thecomposite consumption good is equal to its normalized market price.
Given the optimal values ofIt, Dt, Lt, and Zt for the young adult, then the optimal values of
Mt*, T Dt*, Lt*, and Zt' are:
11
(14) M: =d„,[p°,...,p?.pr p '^,AGE„,...,AGEt,ED,V(0).X„,...,X„H„0] .
Tr =d,„[p°,...,P?.pr,-.PT.AGE„....,AGE„ED,V(OXXo,....X„H„tI.] .
D; =dnJp°.....p?,p?,....p?.AGE„,...,AGE,.ED.V(0), X„,...,X„H„0] .
..L*.=d,,[p?,...,p?,p^...,p^AGE„,-...,AGE„ED,V(0),X„....,X„H„cD] . .
z; =d,_[p°,...,p?,p:,...,p?,AGE„....,AGE„ED.V(0). X„,....X„O] .
where Xi is a vector of other explanatory variables. •Given these equations, we also have the
following:
(15) I:=I[M^T,"^ED] .
• h;,,={i-^[age,.d:.h^]}h:+i: .
w:=w[h:,d:.age,,ed.q.,He, o] .
IV. ECONOMETRIC MODEL
The econometric model is a four equation structural model, which allows us to
examine feedback among endogenous variables. The optimal conditions in (10), (11), and
(12) are treated as structural demand equations for health, binge drinking, and leisure,
respectively. Equation (7) is included to account for the stochastic wage in labor supply
equation. Before specifying our empirical model, we transform the first-order conditions ofIt
and Di into estimable forms. Equations (10) and (11) can be further simplified by substituting
the equilibrium conditions for I and Din period t-l into equation (10) and (11), respectively.
(16)
7t
t-l
= {r-^,_i+(5[Aj, D(t),HE]}
12
(17) - b-'U + u
'bmD|-l
1
+ —
b
T^vV -P°
^U„,+w„T.»
=[^u.
A.
U t-»-i.'D,
where'^(t-'l) is defined as'and-r.^(t- l) is assumed.to bezero; Equation
(16) represents the equilibrium condition for It in terms ofhealth capital, Ht. The left-hand
J''' • ^ w. . j" .• .M . . .
sideincludes the monetary value of psychic return and the earnings return to an additional umt
ofhealth capital, ^(t) can beviewed as the market price ofhealth capital. The right-hand
side of equation (16) becomes the net cost ofholding one unit ofhealth capital, which consists
of three components: interest rate, capital depreciation and capitalgains. In other words, the
cost of holding one unit of health capital for one period is the forgone interest income andthe
depreciation, while the monetary rewards are the potential capital gains from holding it for
one more period, ^(t-1).
• 1 . ' ^ *11. ^ r •'
The structural demand equations contain lead and lag endogenous variables. In the
• • I ' ) / I ^
following econometricspecification, we chooseto drop lead and lag endogenous variables
when these variables cause multicollinearity. The structural demand function for health ofa
young adult is similar to the one in Grossman's (1972, a,b), except that the current model
treats the wage as endogenous and includes the impact of addiction and health endowment on
current health. From equation (16), we specify a linear demand function for the current health
status of an individual and give sigh predictions:
13
(18) H't =;?, +rj2^t+n3V +V5^e +%^GE,+Tj,SCli
+ ^sDOC^ +%BED^ + 77,0Y; + u^ \
where = 1if H' > 0
= 0 otherwise ,
72 <0> ^73 >0,74 >0,75 >0'76 <0.77 >0,78 79? •
Health is abinary variable in our data set, and hence will be treated as an unobserved
latent variable. We only observe the value ofHt depending on Ht >0or<0. BED and DOC
represent the number ofhospital beds and physicians per 100,000 population in the
respondent's residence area, respectively. The number ofhospital beds and physicians per
100,000 population approximate the degree of scarcity in, medical resources and partially
reflect themedical costs in the area ofresidence. More physicians and hospital beds indicate
lower medical costs. Larger hours ofwork increase the return in the market from good health
and hence increase the demand. 01 is the nonwage income, SCH is the individual s schooling,
and Yt is avector ofother exogenous variables including an individual's gender, race, marital
status, and location (urbanization). u\ is a normal random error term.
Given equation (17), the individual's binge drinking demand equation is:
(19) D't = >5, +AH, + +AD,_, +AD.., +fieOh +
+A(MINAGE*DMINAGE)++AoHe +AiSCH++M2 ;
where D^ = 1if D^ < 0
= 2ifO<D;</i2
= 3 if .
14
Bingedrinking is^an-ordered-response variable with three categories: "no binge
drinking", "binge drinking'S and "heavy binge drinking". Like health, binge drinking isviewed
as a latent.variable .whose value is not observed. . Instead,-we obsen^e the ordinal responses
depending on whether orhot Dt' is <=0, orbetween 0 and \X2, or>112-
MINAGE is the minimum legal drinking agefor the individual's state of residence and
DMINAGE is an indicator, which equals'I'if the individual's age is less than the minimum
legal drinking ageand is zero otherwise. Thus, our-minimum legaLdrinking age variable is
defined asMINAGE multiplied byDMINAGE., For individuals.who are, older than the
minimum legal drinking age, of] a state,-the minimum drinking age regulation should haye little
or no effect on current binge drinking. We expect the minimum legal drinking age law to
deter underage drinking. Xt is a vector of other exogenous variables, which includes an
individual's marital status, location,,gender, race,,indicator for drinking before age 18,
indicator for delinquent behavior, indicator for alcoholic parents, and. local unernployment
rates, uz is a normal random error term.
The inclusion of future binge drinking in the demand function for current binge
drinking distinguishes the rational addiction model from the myopic model. An individual is
potentially addicted to alcohol if an increase in his/her current alcohol consumption increases
his/her future alcohol consumption. This is equivalent to saying that current and past, and
' ' ' . M", • • .
current and future consumption are complements across adjacent time periods. The
coefficients ofDm and D^-i are expected to be positive and statisticallysignificant if addiction
15
is rational behavior. The coefficient on mature height is expected to be positive because
medical research shows that people with larger body size become intoxicated more slowly
than people with smaller body size. Alarger size body can accommodate more alcohol with
fewer negative effects.
The individual's structural labor supply equation is:
(20) InTj"^ =«! + +afil, +OTjlnw^ +a^AGE^ +a^AGEl^ +cZgHg +agK[ +u^ ;
> 0, £23 < 0, < 0,0:5 > 0, > 0, a, < 0,Og > 0,
where Rt is a vector of other exogenous variables including an indicator for an individual's
gender, race, number ofchildren younger than 6, and location, and local labor market
conditions; 01 is the family' s nonwage income and AGE2t is the square of the individual's
age at period t. 1/3 is a normal random error term.
The individual's human-capital based wage equation is:
(21) InWj = Vi +V2H^ +V4AGE( +V5AGE2j +1^78011
+ v^AFQT +VgQ[+u^ ;
V2 >0, V3 <0, V4 >0, V5 <0, Vfi >0, V7 >0, Vg >0,
where Qt is avector ofother variables indicating an individual's race, region ofresidence,
marital status, and local unemployment rates. AFQT (Armed Forces Qualifications Test)
percentile is included to control for the quality of schooling and ability. This is particularly
important when the quality of schooling and ability differ (Blackburn and Neumark, 1995).
By including AFQT percentile, we expect to get better estimate of the return to ayear of
schooling. W4 is a normal random error term.
16
IV. DATA AND EMPIRICAL DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES
The data for this study are primarily from theNLSY79^(1979-1994; 1995a,b). It is a
nationally representative sample of12,686 young men and women who were ,14 to 21 years of
age when they were first surveyed in 1979. Surveys are conducted on^an annual basis. The
NLSY79' mainly collects information on the labor market experiences ofAmerican young
adults and bversamples blacksj Hispanics, and economically disadvantaged white youth. ,
Twomeasiires of alcohol consumption are available inthe-NLSY79; (1) the number of
occasions having six ormore drinks in a row in the past 30 days and (2) the total number of
drinks consumed in thepast 30 days. The definition of"a drink" in thesurvey includes a can
ofbeer, a glass ofwine, ora glass ofhard liquor. The first measure is the standard definition
of"binge drinking" used inother studies. "Heavy drinking" is defined as drinking six brmore
drinks on the same occasion on each offive or-moredays in'the past 30 days. We choose
binge.drinking as themeasure of the alcohol consumption in our empirical model because
binge drinlang is an important social problem, and it is more closelyrelated to addiction. The
occasions of binge drinking are available in theNLSY79.for 1982-1985, 1988, 1989,'and
1994. ^
In the survey, binge drinking are grouped into seven levels taking values from 0 to 6
with respect to the following category: 0 occasion,' 1 occasion, 2-3 occasions, 4-5 occasions,
6-7 occasions, 7-8 occasions, and 10 or more occasions. However, the distribution of the
occasions ofbinge drinking is skewed toward zero, and contains a thin tail,when approaching
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greater occasions of binge drinking. Table 1displays thedistribution of occasions ofbinge
drinking. We decided to regroup the responses into three ordinal categories. We reassign 1
to occasions of bingedrinking if the original response is 0, 2 if the original response is 1 or 2,
and 3 if the original response is at least 3. The interpretation of the renumbered values is"no
binge drinking", "binge drinking", and "heavy binge drinking", respectively.
The data pertaining to current health status in the survey focuses onanindividual's
physical limitations to work. We define " good current health status" to occur when an
individual indicates he/she had "no limitation" on the amount or kind ofwork he/she can do.
Hence, current health status is a binary variable, which equals one if the respondent has a
health limitation or zero otherwise. Labor supply is defined as an individual's actual hours
worked at all jobs last,week. The individual's wage is his/her hourly rate ofpay at the main
job for last week.
The "geocodes" in NLSY79 allow us to link area level data with survey data. This is
useful for obtaining data on prices ofbeer, wine, and liquor, and state level data on minimum
legal drinking age. The American Chamber ofCommerce Researchers Association (ACCRA)
publishes the Cost ofLiving Index quarteriy, which collects prices for beer (six-pack canned
Budwsiser\ wine (1.5 liter Livingston Cellars), and liquor (750 ml ofJ&BScotch) for
more than 250 cities in the United States. These price data are the actual prices paid by the
consumers. Before 1982, the Cost ofLiving Index only surveyed prices ofliquor. Regression
analysis is applied to obtain the predicted prices ofbeer and wine for 1979-1982. We
regressed state prices for beer and wine between 1982 and 1996 on state excise tax rates,
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indicators for geographical regions, and.a.time trend., The data on state excise tax rates come
fiom Brewers Almanac., ^ ,
• • IV .. I • . . I I '.
, Our alcohol priceis a composite price based on the alcohol content of beer, wine,, and
liquor. •It is a weighted average price ofa g^lon ofpure ^cphpl, in beer, wine, and liquor.
The weights arethe consumption share ofpure alcohol percapita from beer, wine, and liquor
in thestate of residence, and these data are from the BriersAlmanac.^y/e assume that the
alcohol contents are 4 percent, 15 percent, and .40 percent for beer, wine, and liquor,
respectively. We choose, theprices reported in the^third quarter in.Cost ofLiving Index
because most ofthe NLSY79 surveys coyer the third quarter, and the weighted average price
ofpure alcohol is expressed in constant .19,94-dollar. We convert theprices^pfbeer, wine, and
liquor to the_prices pergallon bydividing.the,reported prices of beer, wine, and liquor by
0.56, 0.396,,and 0.198 respectively. Equation,(22) presents the computation fonnulafor the
unit price ofpure alcohol: ^ ,
(22) .unit price,ofpure alcohol = [(beer price.per gallon / alcohol content).* consumption
share of alcohol per capita from b^eer] + [(wine price per
gallon / alcohol content) * consumption share ofalcohol
percapita from wine] + [(liquor price'per gallon / alcohol
content) * consumption share of alcohol^per capita from
liquor].
We use MSA (Metropolitan Statistical,Areas) and PMSA.(PrimaryMetropolitan
.Statistical Areas) variables to .mergeNLSY79 and the composite alcohol price. For
respondents who did not live in the surveyed cities, we use state average prices, which are the
average prices of,the surveyed cities in,a state. Moreover, if the respondents did not live in
/' > I. ,
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same state or same city in adjacent years, the lead and lag prices are simply calculated as the
average ofthe pure alcohol prices in two different cities orstates. Book ofthe States (1978-
1996) provides thedata onminimum legal drinking age in each state. AFQT percentile isa
composite score derived from selective sections in the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude
Battery (ASVAB) tests.
By 1994, theNLSY79 had 16^waves ofdata. Although alcohol-related questions
were only asked in 7 surveys, health, hours worked, wage, and other socioeconomic variables
arecollected in all 16waves! To fully utilize the advantage of panel data, weuseall sixteen
panels in the first stage ofestimation. For years in which alcohol questions were not asked,
we use predicted values ofthe occasions ofbinge drinking instead. In the second stage, we
include employed respondents only. Consequently, there are 111,595 and 73,863
observations in the first and second stage, respectively. The procedures used to fill-in the
missing values for exogenous variables are demonstrated in Appendix A\'
Since the model consists ofone-year lag and lead variables, theestimation requires
that each respondent participate in at least three consecutive surveys. The following
additional restrictions were placed on observations: (1) respondents who miss three ormore
consecutive surveys were deleted, (2) respondents working more than 75 hours aweek were
deleted, (3) observations reporting hourly wage higher than'$30 were deleted, (4)
observations having amissing value on real alcohol prices were deleted, (5) individuals who
were currently enrolled in school or serve in the armed forces were deleted, and (6) self-
employed individuals and those working on the family farm or family business were also
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deleted. Table 2 presents a summary of empirical definitions of variables and descriptive
statistics for the sample ofyoung adults in this'study.
VI. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND.MODEL SIMULATIONS
Thedependent variables of the.empirical model are health status, fin hours worked, fin
hourly wage, and the number of occasions ofbinge drinking in the past30 days. Health status
is a binary variable, and the occasions of binge drinking are ordered responses. The
simultaneous equation model is estimated using the instrumental variable estimator, which is
similar to the procedures proposed by Nelson and Olson (IPTS). '^"*
. At the first stage, each endogenous variable is regressed on a set of instrumental,
variables: The instruments consist of all exogenous variables in the model and the first year
lead and firstyear lag of-the following variables: real excise tax; minimum legal drinking age,
real state secondary education expenditure per capita, real net family, income andmarital
status. The predicted values for the limited dependent variables, currenthealth status, and
occasions ofbinge drinking, are the predicted latentvalues, X'p yrather than its predicted
probability. The second-stage procedure is to substitute for the endogenous variables on the
' right hand side of the system using their predicted value's and'then estimate the system by
probit (current health status), ordinal probit (occasions of binge drinking), and least squares
(labor supply and the wage). Nelson and Olson have shown that the estimates obtained by
this procedure are consistent and asymptotically normal, although the procedure is not the
most efficient. Because the endogenous variablesare a mixture ofcontinuous and quditative
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variables, we choose bootstrap standard errors.^
We followed the approaches used byHeckman (1976), Zebel (1998), andZillak and
Kniesner (1998) to correct for self-selection into employment and attrition. The decisions of
participation in the labor market and in the survey may be jointly determined. For example,
unemployed respondents may also bemore likely towithdraw from the survey. To investigate
ifthey are jointly determined, we fitted a bivariate probit model to estimate the cross-equation
correlation of distributions. Becausedata are unavailable when attrition occurred, exogenous
variables in theprevious year are used to predict theprobability of participating in current
year. The results show that the correlation coefficient is -0.23 and not significantly different
from zero at the 5% level. Consequently, each probit equation was fitted separately and the
results are used to construct two inverse Mill's ratio. However, theMill's ratio associated
with attrition was not significant and deleted from our final specifications in Table3 toTable?.
A. The Demandfor Health
Thestructural estimates of thedemand forhealth are presented inTable 3. Bothbinge
drinking and age have negative coefficients, implying that an increase in either variable raises
the full price (cost) ofacquiring one additional unit ofhealth capital and, consequently,
decreases an Individual's demand for health. The effect ofage is statistically significant at the
5% level and suggests that an individual's health capital declines over his/her life cycle. A
five-year increase in an individual's age reduced the probability ofgood health by 0.005.
Additional schooling shifts the health demand function outward and results in higher
levels ofhealth capital demanded. Increase an individual's schooling by one year increases the
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probability ofhim/her having good current health status by 0.003.^ When an individual h^
larger hours ofwork, the return in the market from good health rises and hence increases
his/her demand for health. An increase in family nonwage income increases the demand for
health, indicating that an individual's health is.a normal good. However,,the coefficient is not
statistically significant. ^ ... -i . .
'Although a greater number ofphysicians per 100,000 population and hospital beds per
100,000 population and an urban residence may indicate lower medical cpsts, these variables
have positive coefficients in the demand.for health equation but are not statistically sig^ficant.
These variables do not seem to capture the true medical costs faced by each individual.
Being married, male, and Hispanic increases the demand for health capital. Also, the results
suggest that health endowment, as measured:by .mature height, has a significant positive effect
on the demand for.health. A six inch increase in height results in ai) increase in the probability
ofgood health.by 0.005.- i .
"Q, The Demandfor Binge Drinking, i,,;. ..
The ordinal probit-estimates of the demand for binge drinking arepresented in Table 4.
Thereal purealcohol price has a negative and significant (at 5 percent-level) effect on an
individual's demand for binge, drinking. A,one dollar increase in the price of purealcohol per
gallon decreases an individual!s probability of"heavy binge drinkinjg'- by 0.001 and increases
the probabilities of "binge drinking" and "np binge drinking" by 0.006 and 0.004, respectively.
An increase in,theminimum legal drinking age significantly reduces an individual's
demand for binge drinking when he/she,is an underage youth. In the.early 1980s, drunk
23
driving was the main cause oftraffic fatalities and state governments began to increase the
minimum drinking age. In 1984, Congress passed a law requiring all states to enforce a
minimum legal drinking age of21, orthey would lose their federal highway funding as
punishment. Consequently, many states raised the minimum drinking age to 21 after 1984. A
one year increase in the minimum legal drinking age decreases an individual's probability of
"heavy binge drinking" by 0.04 and increases both the probabilities of"binge drinking" and
"no binge drinking" by 0.02. Since early initiation ofalcohol use is strongly related to the
development ofalcoholism, preventing underage youth from an early experience ofalcohol
use seems possible and fruitful.
Our results support a forward looking framework in the sense that an increase in an
individual's demand for health reduces his/her demand for binge drinking. We find evidence
against the assumption that binge drinking and leisure are complements; an individual shours
worked are positively related to binge drinking, but, the coefficient has asmall t value.
Increasing an individual's past and anticipated fiiture binge drinking has apositive and
significantly effect on his/her current binge drinking. This indicates not only that current, past
and future binge drinking are complements, but also that frequent binge drinking is addictive
and habit-forming. Furthermore, the statistically significant coefficient on lead (anticipated .
future )binge drinking supports the rational addiction model in the sense that heavy binge
drinkers are not myopic, instead they are forward-looking.
The effect ofan individual's age on his/her demand for binge drinking is negative and
statistically significant at 10 percent level, supporting the maturing-out hypothesis and impact
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of finite life. A oneyear increase in the individual's age decreases his/her probability of"heavy
binge drinking" by 0.05 and increases thC; probabilities of "binge drinking" and."no binge ,
drinking" by'0.03 and 0.02,jrespectively. Increasing^an individual's schooling significantly
reduces his/herdemandfor bingedrinking. This is consistent with previous findings that
college graduates have the fewest occasions ofbinge drinking, although college students
make the news for sometimes drinking excessively. Anadditional year of schooling,decreases
an individual's probability of "heavy'binge drinking" by,0.021 andjincreases his/her
probabilities, of "binge drinking" and "no binge drinking" by0.012. and 0.009, respectively.
Higher family nonwage income significantly increases an individual's.demand for binge
drinking, which supports the^hypothesis that binge drinking,is a npi^nal good. A one thousand
dollar increase in nonwage income .increases the.pro,bability,pf "heavy, bingedrinking" by
0.0006 and reduces both the probabilities of "binge drinking". and "no bingedrinking" by;
0.003. Other personal characteristicsjand the.local environment affect thedemand for binge
drinking-.. Beingmaleor living in an urban area.increases the demand.for bingedrinking
whereasbeingmarried, black, andHispanic reduces an individual's demand for bingedrinking.
When an individual has early delinquent behavior or "started drinking before-the age of 18,"
he/she has an increased demand for binge drinking. If an individual initiated drinking before
y r , • - > - - -
the age of 18, he/she is more likely to become'addicted, which leads to higher fi*equencies of
binge drinking later.
The hypothesis that local econdinic conditions are related to the demand for binge
drinking is also suppbrted'in Table4. The coefficient of the local unemployment rate has the
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predicted positive sign, but it isonly significant at 10 percent level. The effect ofan
individual's height on the demand for binge drinking is positive, but statistically insignificant.
Hence, size as approximated byheight does not significantly affect the demand for binge
drinking, other things equal.
C. WageEquation
The estimates of the wage equation are reported in Table 5. Consistent with
expectations, an individual's health has a positive and significant effect on his/her wage or
labor productivity. One additional unit ofhealth capital increases the wage by 28 percent,
indicating that the effect ofhealth on the wage is much stronger than its, effect on hours
worked. More importantly, binge drinking does significantly lower the individual's wage,
suggesting diminished labor productivity. The direct effect ofa one unit increase in the latent
value ofthe binge drinking variable decreases the hourly wage by 1.7 percent. The total effect
will be 2percent when we take into account the indirect effect ofbinge drinking through
health:
__3a£}5:5i5L_=o.017-0.286» g(Health)
a(Binge Drinking) a(Binge Drinking)
The wage is concave in an individual's age, and the effect ofage peaks at 36 years.
Added schooling increases the wage through increased labor productivity, holding other
things equal including the AFQT percentile constant. One additional year of schooling has the
direct effect of increasing the wage by nearly 2percent, and there are indirect effects through
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heath and binge drinking. Hence, at the sample mean, the total effect is 3 percent;
= 0 017 ^ 0 286* - 0.017 * a 0.03 .
5EDU ^DU cEDU
The positive and statistically significant coefficient ofAFQT percentile implies that
ability and schooling quality also plays an important role in determining the wage. Moving up
ten percentiles in the AFQT score distribution which is equal to 25 percent increase in the
sample average AFQT percentile (38), leads to a2 percent increase in the wage. The results
suggest that, excluding AFQT would bias the estimated coefficients ofother variables,
especiallyofyears of schooling.
Taller individuals, indicating a larger health endowment at young adulthood, have a
higher wage, implying that the return to current investment in current health might be
overestimated if health endowment is ignored. The direct effect of adding 6 inches to an
individual's height is to increase his/her wage by 2percent. Like schooling, there are indirect
effects through health and binge drinking and the total effect is doubled to 4 percent;
. 0.041 ^0,286 * -0.017 * s 0.08
^Height ^Height ^Height
The findings onother variables are consistent with most other wage studies. Being
male or married increases the individual's wage, and being black or Hispanic lowers his/her
wage relative to being white. Holding human capital and other variables constant, a higher
local unemployment rate lowers the wage faced by individuals. Individuals living in urban
areas received a higher wage than those living in rural areas.
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D. Labor Supply Equation
Table 6 shows that most of the coefficients are consistent with the findings in the labor
supply literature. The labor supply response to an increase inan individual's wage is positive
and significant, although themagnitude is small. The negative effect of family nonwage
income on an individual's laborsupply implies that leisure is a normal good. Themagnitude
of the effect, however, is relatively small, e.g., a thousand dollars increase in family nonwage
income reduces hoursworkedby only 0.03 percent. The coefficients of age and age square
show a life-cycle pattern of labor supply where labor supply is concave in age, and it peaks at
age 26 in our data.
An individual's health status has a strongly positive effect on his/her labor supply. In
ourmodel, the long-run effect ofbinge drinking is captured in the health variable. One
additional unit ofhealth capital increases hours worked by 10 percent. Aone unit increase in
the latent value ofbinge drinking has a somewhat surprising direct effect to increase labor
supply by 5.8 percent. The indirect effects ofbinge drinking on labor supply are through
health and the wage. Consequently, the overall effect ofbinge drinking on labor supply is
about 5.6 percent:
g(HoursWorked) ^^ ^^ +0.00033* 8(Lnwage)
(26) 5(Binge Drinking) 5(Binge Drinking) 5(Binge Drinking)
= 0.056
Being an urban resident reduces an individual's hours ofwork, other things equal.
Being male or married increase labor supply. Hours worked differ significantly across races.
Being black or Hispanic increases hours ofwork about four percent more per week relative to
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beingwhites, other things equal. Individuals who'had'young children-work fewerHours. One
additional child in-the individual's household'Under-age 5 and between age 5 and 12 decreases
hoursworked by 3;7-aLrid 2.2 percent, respectively. On the bther;hand; an individual-s-.hours
wbi*ked increases by 4.4 percentwith the presence ofone additional-child in the household
over age'12.' An'individual's height-has no significant effect on hours,worked,implying that
excludinghealth endowment would-notbias estimatesof labor supply.' . J' *
' I
£. Model Simulations andDiscussion
In this sectio'n, a broader set ofimplications 'ofour empiricial results for-public policy
and labor market outcomes are presented:-' First,Jpolicyisimulations showing the effects of
changing the alcohol price-oi* the legal drinking age on behavior:are derived. Re'duced-form
equations for our four-equation'model-are-first-obtairied. They:are then.used to compute the
short-nin and 16ng-run"alcohol priceelasticity-ofdemand for;health'and binge drinking, of
labor supply and of the'wage.^ In these simulations, we include only respondents participating
in every survey between 1979 and 1994. This is to minimize the effect of survey ,
nonparticipation on the simulated results:- Because the reduced-form solutions are flinctions
ofcurrent, past-and future values of exogenous.variables,andithe time horizon of these
exogenous variables goes forward andbackward tO'infinity, .it is necessary to.make . ,
assumptions about-the data outside the sample years. 'In;the simulations, .values of exogenous
variables'for years before 1979are arbitrarily set-^equal to .their 1979jvalues and valuesof
exogenous variables for years after d994 are set equal to their 1994 values.- '*•
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The.computations also depend on how quickly the effects ofthepast and anticipated
future values ofvariables diminish in their impact on the current value of the endogenous
variables. The unstable root, 1.7, implies that the effects of future values of variables are
approximately zero after 18 years. The stable root, 0.56, suggests that the effects from past
values ofvariables will approach zero in 10 years. Therefore, thecalculation in each year uses
the actual values of leadvariables for 18 years in the future and the values of lagged variables
for 10 years in the past. We impose a stability condition to derive the long-run price
elasticities.
We,simulate the long-run and short-run elasticities ofendogenous variables with
respect to the alcohol prices and minimum legal drinking age, and the results are reported in
Table 7. The short-run elasticity measures the effect ofan unanticipated permanent increase
in the alcohol price (or minimum legal drinking age) starting from period t, on endogenous
variables in period t. The long-run price elasticity estimates the effect ofan anticipated
permanent change in the alcohol price (or minimum drinking age) in all fiiture periods on the
endogenous variables.
The price elasticity of demand for binge drinking requires special interpretation
because binge drinking is an ordinal response. The elasticity shows the effect of raising the
alcohol price (or minimum legal drinking age) on the probability of an individual being in the
heavy binge drinking group, binge drinking group, or no binge drinking group, respectively.
The own-price elasticity of demand for binge drinking is relatively large in the short- and long-
run, and consistent with the standard economic theory, i.e., the long-run price elasticity is
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larger.than the.short-run.elasticity.,Binge drinking.is quite responsivejo the price ofalcohol—
• a 1percent increase in the alcohol price^decreases the probability ofbeing a heavy binge,
drinker by 1.94. percent.. iThcidemand for,binge drinking,in inelastic in the short run, which is
also supportive ofbinge drinking being,addictive,,and binge drinkers taking longer to adjust to
apricechange. " ' !' . ' ;
• Becausethe surnmation of the,ielasticit[es-ofheavy binge drinking, binge.drinking,.and
no binge drinking; should,equal one, our results show that an increase in the alcohol price
effectively decreases the occasions.ofbinge .drinking andthat an individual,is inuch more likely
to become a non-binge drinker; ;The elasticity of demand for health with respect to the
alcohol price and the elasticity of the wage with Respect to the alcohol price are positive, but
the elasticity ofhours worked with respect to the price ofalcohol is negative. Although the
magnitudes are fairly small, the important finding is that raising the alcohol price promotes
human health and improves labor productivity -
' - ' The.elasticity of demand for binge drinking with respect to the minimum drinking age
is negative but small, implying that the potential for decreasing binge drinking by raising the
minimum legal drinking age may be limited. ' - ~
*- Second,ithe real wage rate of niales declined oyer 1973 to 1,996, .and-Our results can
shed some light on some of the contributing factors. Steckel's (1995) evidence shows that the
1979NLSY cohort iis about 1 inch shorter than trend. Bishop's (1989) results suggest that the
•educational achievement at high school graduation of the 1979NLSY cohort was about 0.5
standard deviations or 2.grade levels below trend and,.hence, .we interpret this to mean that
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the mean AFQT score is 0.5 standard deviations (15 percentiles) below trend. We suggest
that the tendency to binge drink among the NLSY1979 cohort'is about 15 percent higher than
for youths in the early 1960s (based on the reduction in minimum legal drinking age in many
states between 1960 and 1970, and a 20 percent increase in death rates from motor vehicle
accidents for 15-24 years olds in 1970 and 1980 relative to 1960, U.S. Department ofHealth
and Human Services, 1992, pl73). We approximate that a one unit increase in the latent value
ofbinge drinking is approximately equivalent to a 12 percent increase in the sample mean-of
the ordinal binge drinking variable. Using information on the marginal effects ofAFQT,
height, and binge drinking on the wage, we estimate that the real wage is about 6percent''
lower than what would havebeenthe cause if theNLSY1979 cohort had remained on the
trends established bybirth cohorts through the early 1950s.
m CONCLUSIONS
This research has focused on the decisions of young adult between ages 14 and37
affecting their current health, binge drinking, and labor supply, and the impacts oftheir
decisions on their wage. Our empirical results support the rational addiction model that the
behavior ofbinge drinking is rational and the demand for health, binge drinking, and labor
supply arejointly determined.
Our results also show that an individual's demand for binge drinking can be reduced
significantly by asizeable increase in the excise tax on alcohol. An increase in the alcohol
price was shown to significantly reduce the probability of"heavy binge drinkmg" and mcrease
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the probability of"no binge drinking"'^ br'controlling for early experiences with alcohol and
delinquent behavior." Although we find that the-demahd for binge drinking by underage youth
is responsive to the.minimum legal drinking age, the minimum legal drinking age iscurrently
21 years, and fiirther'increases seein unlikely:
••The total effect ofbinge'drinking on an individual's wage'^d labor'supply-includes a
direct effect and indirecteffects, which comethrough the effectofbingedrinking on his/her
health status and (or) wage. Ourfindings showed that binge'd'rinkiiig doeshave a significant
negative effect on labor productivity. Nonetheless', tfte direct effect ofbinge drinking on an
individual's labor supply is strongly positive, whereas the indirect effect (through health and
wage) is negative, but small. As a result,'for this relatively young sample, when an individual
binge drinks, his/her hours worked and earnings iiicrease. Stroriger'negative indirect effects of
bingedrinking through an individual's health andwagemight be obtained if the sample
contained older individuals; Our results showed'that an individual's health rheasured in
Height; currenthealth status; arid binge drinking behavior have economically significant effects
on labor productivity, i.e., the wage. Therefore, investing in child health and niaintaining
' ' • ^ ^ I.--. ..... - ^
healthy lifestyles are important to labor market success.
' • ' • I.
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Endnotes
1 wewould like to thank Dr. Hal Stem, associate professor of department of statistics at
Iowa State University, for advising the procedures ofhot-deck imputation.
2. Predicted real family income and predicted real nonwage income are substituted for
missing values in real family income and real nonwage income. Real nonwage income is
defined as family income excluding respondent's wage earnings.
3. Agood review ofthe estimation methods for simultaneous equations with limited
dependent variables can be found in Amemiya (1974, 1978, and 1979), Lee (1982b), and
Maddala (1983). We also instrument the lead and lag values ofbinge drinking because
they are endogenous.
4. The instrumental variable approach is similar to the two-stage least square and the
estimation in the first stage is statistically significant. The chi-square statistics for the ^
demand for health, current binge drinking, lag binge drinking, and lead binge drinking in
the first stage are 4,838, 9,561, 9,481, and 10,071 respectively. The F statistics for labor
supply and the wage equations are 344 and 977 respectively.
5. Bootstrap is acomputer-based nonparametric method ofstatistical inference and it was first
developed and introduced by Efron (1979). The classical situation is that a random sample,
X, ofsize nis observed from an unknown probability distribution F. We are interested in the
distribution ofa random variable Y(X,F), which possibly is a function ofXand the unknown
distribution F. The sampling distribution ofYis estimated on the basis ofthe observed data
X. The bootstrap method begins first by treating the sample Xas an empirical population or
A
the sample probability distribution F.
We generate random samples fi'om F by bootstrapping pairs. Bootstrapping pairs is
conducted by resampling ablock of dependent and independent variables with replacement
fi'om all possible contiguous blocks simultaneously. The choice of the block length is
conditional on degree of autocorrelation. We chose three years because the estimation
requires one-year lead and lag variables. Efron (1993) shows that the outcomes fi'om
bootstrapping pairs (i.e., endogenous variables and vector of exogenous variables) are less
sensitive to the distributional assumption than bootstrapping residuals. Most importantly,
bootstrappping residuals violate the basic idea of nonparametric analysis behind the
bootstrap because adistributional assumptions must be made to compute the residuals of
any limited dependent variable.
To obtain the bootstrap distribution for the bootstrap structural estimators, Monte Carlo
method is performed. We repeat the bootstrapping procedure 1,000 times to get 1,000
bootstrap samples and 1,000 bootstrap stmctural estimates. The variances then are
approximated by the variances of i.OOO bootstrap structural estimates. The bootstrap
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standard errors are computed for thesecond-stage estimates and reported in our tables of
results.
6. . . Theprocedures for solving the simultaneous system and deriving price elasticities are
included in-Appendix B; • • '
7. Thewage gapbetween NLSY79 cohort and'birth-cohort in 1950 is estimated as follows:
(difference-in AFQT perceritile) * 5(Lnwage)/5AFQT +(difference in height measured in
inch) * 5(Lnwage)/9Height +(percentage difference in binge drinking) *
5(Lnwage)/5(Binge Drinking) = (15*0.002)> (1*0.67) + (15*(0.017/12)) = 0.03 +
0.0067 +0.021 « 0.06
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Table 1. Frequency, Percentage and Cumulative Percentage oftheDistribution ofthe
Occasions of Binge Drinking Frequency Percentage Cumulative Percentage
0 Occasion 33,780 66.0 66.0
1 Occasion 4,883 9.5 75.6
2-3 Occasions 5,870 11.5- 87.0
4-5 Occasions 2,951 • 5.8 92.8
6-7 Occasions 1,287 2.5 95.3
8-9 Occasions 652 1.3 96.6
10 or More Occasions 1.745 3.4 100.0
Total 51,168 100.0 100:0
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Table 2. Definitions, Means,, and Standard Errors of Variables
Variable
Health "
I
Binge Drinking
Log Hours Worked
Log Wage
Schooling
Age-
Age2 ' ''
Black ' • • '
Hispanics
Father's Education
Mother's Education
Married
Urban ' . -
MINIAGE
DMINIAGE
Mean
(Standard Error)
- 0.07 (0.25)
.. '1.47(0.71)
' - :-i'.
..•1 3-.56'(0.49)
' 2.15 (0.46)
12.35 (2.29)
25.-29 (4;27)
657:91 (218.14)
•- 0.27(0.44)
0.17(0.38)
• 10..7Vi(3.94)
^'•10.71'(3.19)
0.4L(0:49)
0.80 (0.4)
• 20^23 (i;i7)
•. ' 0j07 (0.26)
Definition
Price ofPure Alcohol ^ ^ 149.73. (13.47)
Dichotomous variable equals 1 if health
limits the amount and kind ofwork the
:respondent can do
•Ordinal response; no binge drinking (1), ,
bingedrinking (2), and heavy bingedrinking
V('3)'in the past 30 days
Log ofhours worked at alljobs last week
fNatural log of real hourly wage -
Highest grade completed
1Age of.the respondent
Age square of the respondent
' -Dichotomous variable equals 1 if respondent
is African American
Dichotomous variable equals 1 if respondent
is Hispanic
Highest grade completed by respondent's
father
.Highest-grade completed by respondent's
mother
Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if
respondent is married - , - ^
Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if ,
respondent lives in.urban area i;
State minimum legal drinking'age,--'^ ,
Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the
' respondent is younger than.Iegal minimum
drinking age ... '
Weighted average real price of a gallon of
.pure alcohol in beer, wine, and liquor^
AFQT test percentile
Number ofchildrenwho are younger than 5
years old at home
Number of children who are older than 5
years old, but younger than 12 years old
Number of children who are older than 12
years old, but younger than 18 years old
KIDS5
KIDS 12
KIDS18
38:65 .(28.51)
"OAl (0.76) "
0.25 (0.61)'
0.04 (0.24)
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Table 2. (continued)
Variable
Dagel4
Height
Male'
DI1180
Local Unemployment
Rate
Northeast
North-Central • •
West
Alcoholic Parents •
DRINK18 '
Physicians Per 100,000
Population ^
Hospital Beds Per
100,000 Population
Net Family Income^ .
• Family Nonwage Income^
Dworking
Lambdal
Mean
(Standard Error)
Definition
0.68 (0.47)
^ 5,58 (0.34)
• 0.47(0.50)
0.10(0:30)
3:10(1.07)
. 0.18(0.39)
0.24 (0.43)
0.19(0.40)
. .0.24(0.43)
•0.44 (0.50)
1811.92' /
(1285.18)
6258.92 '•
'(4624.65)
.•35.73 (60.93)
• .20.05 (53.93)
0.70 (0.46)
;• 0.51 (0.27).
Dichotomous variable equals 1 if respondent
lives with parents at age of 14
Height (in feet)
.Dichotomous variable equals 1 if respondent
is male
Dichotomous variable equals 1 if the
respondent had delinquent record in 1980
Local .unemployment rate
• t
' Dichotomous variable equals 1 that if
respondent lives inthe northeast region
Dichotomous variableequals 1 if respondent
lives in the north central region
Dichotomous variableequals 1 if respondent
lives in the west region
. Dichotomous variable^equals 1 if respondent
has alcoholic parents
^ Dichotomous variable equals 1 if starting
drinking before age 18
Physicians per 100,000 population at current
residence
Hospital beds per 100,000 population at
current residence
Real total net family income including assets
• (in thousands)
Real family nonwage income (in thousands)
Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if
currentlyworking for a-wage • .
Inverse Mill's ratio: correction for unit non-
response
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Table 3. Structural Estimates of The Demand for Health (Probability of Being Healthy)
Explanatory Variables
PredictedBinge Drinking . -.. ^.
Predicted Log Hours Worked
Family Nonwage Income
Age
Height
Schooling
Male
Black
Hispanic
Married
Urban
Physicians Per 100,000 Population.
Hospital Beds Per 100,000 Population
Lambda
• -
Chi-Square statistics( Degree ofFreedom = 14)
Number ofobservations
Dependent Variable: Health Limitation
• -0.012 (0.033) -
0.319 (0.088)***
0.0002 (0:0003)
-o.ors (0.003)***-
- •"0\135(0;04)***'
0.039 (0;007)***-'
0.139'(a036)'***
•6'.012'(0:032)
•'0.128 (6.030)***
0.061 (0.027)**
-0.008 (0.028)
0.00001 (0.000009)
0.000001 (0.000003)
0.178 (0.082)***
209.65
73,863
'Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses.
Predicted occasions ofbinge drinking is the predicted latent value ofhaving more than 4
occasions,ofbinge drinking in the past 30 days.
** Statistically significant at the 5 % level.
***Statistically significant at the 1 % level.
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Tabled. Structural Estimates of The Demand for binge drinking (Probability of Having
Greater Occasions of Binge Drinking)
Explanatory Variables
Predicted Health ,
Predicted Hours Worked
PredictedLag BingeDrinking''
Predicted Lead Binge Drinking''
Pure Alcohol Price
MINIAGE XDMINIAGE
FamilyNonwage Income
Age
Height
Schooling ;,
Male
Black- ,
Hispanic - ,
Married , . .
'Urban
DILL80
DRINK18
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Dependent Variable: Occasions of
Binge Drinking
-0.043 (0.021)**
"0.095 (0.071)'
0.418 (0.065)*** '
0.440(0.056)***
-0.0008 (0.0004)**
-0.003 (0.0015)**
0.0004 (0.0002)**
-0.004 (0.0023)*
0.044(0.031)
-0.015 (0.006)**
0.071 (0.033)**
-0.097(0.026)***
-0.028 (0.021)
-0.096(0.026)***
0.032(0.018)*.
/ , 0.069(0.028)**'
• '0.07(0.027)**'
Table 4. (continued)
Explanatory Variables - , , DependentVariable: Occasions of
- - ' - - BingeDrinking
LocalUnemployment Rate 0.012(0.007)*
Lambda ' 0.031 (0.08)
Chi-Squarestatistics ( Degree of Freedom=19) 6,482.85
Number of observations 35,183
'Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses.
'T'redicted health limit is thepredicted latent value ofbeing healthy.
^Predicted lag occasions of binge drinking is the predicted latentvalue of having more than4
occasions ofbinge drinking in past 30days.
"^Predicted lead'bccasiohS'Ofbinge drinking is the predicted latentvalue of having more than
4 occasions,of binge drinking in the past 30 days.
* Statistically significant at the 10 % level.
** Statistically significant at the 5 % level.
***Statistically.significant at the 1% level.
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Table 5. Structural Estimates of the Log Wage Equation
Explanatory Variables Dependent Variable: Log Wage
Predicted Health^
Predicted Binge Drinking®
Age
Age2
Height
Schooling
AFQT
Male
Black
Hispanic
Married
Local Unemployment Rate
Urban
West
Northeast
North Central
Lambda
Adjusted R-square
F Statistics
Number of observations
- - 0.286 (0.14)**
-0.017(0.008)**
0,096 (0.012)***
-0.001 (0.0002)***
- 0.041 (0.017)**
0.018 (0.009)**
• 0.002(0.0006)***
- 0.08 (0.005)***
-0.026(0.013)** -
.0.0004 (0.017)
0.063 (0.013)*** -
-0.029 (0.005)***
0.069 (0.008)***
0.134(0.018)***
0.129 (0.009)***
0.064 (0.021)***
-0.12(0.051)***
0.378
2639.1
73,863
""Predicted health limit is the predicted latent value ofbeing healthy.
"bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses.
^Predicted occasions ofbinge drinking is the predicted latent value ofhaving more than 4
occasions of binge drinking inthepast 30 days.
** Statistically significant at the5% level.
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level.
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Table 6. Structural Estimates of The Labor Supply Equation
Explanatoir Variable ^ ; -Dependent'Variable: Log(HoursWorked)
PredictedHealth' ' 0.1 (0.044)**
Predicted Binge Drinking'^ 0.058 (0.011)***
Family Nonwage Income / -0.0003 (0.00005)***
Predicted Lnwage - -0.033 (0.016)**
Age 0.263 (0.01)***
Age2 -0.005 (0.0002)***
Height 0.002(0.0.11), ,
Male ' " ^ ' 0.067(0.01)***'
Urban -0.026(0.015)*
Black ' 0.036(0.011)***
Hispanic . ' • i 0.036 (0.006)***
Married . , 0.054(0.007)***- ••
KIDS5 -0.037 (0.009)***
KIDS12 • ' ' - • •-0.022'(0;006)***
KIDS18 •. ' 0.045 (0.008)***
Lambda -0.018 (0.064)
i' 1. • . . ^
Adjusted R-square 0.142
' '"i ill
F statistics 761.51
Number ofobservations 73,863
'Bootstrap standard errors are.in parentheses.
'Predicted health limit is the predicted latent value ofbeing healthy.
I'redicted occasions of binge drinking is the predicted latent value of having more than 4
occasions of bingedrinking in the past 30 days.
* Statistically significant at the 10% level.
** Statistically significant at the 5 % level.
♦♦♦Statistically significant at the 1% level.
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Table 7. Short run and Long run Elasticity of Demand for Health, Demand for Binge
Drinking, Labor Supply, and Wagewith Respect to Alcohol price and
MinimumLegaldrinking Age (Labor Productivity)
Demand for Health (Probability ofGood
Health)
Demand for Binge Drinking:
(a) ProbabilityofBeing inHeavy
Binge
Drinking Group
Short Run
Long Run
Short Run
Elasticity
Alcohol Price Minimum Legal
Drinking Age
0.00007
0.0001
-0.86
0.00001
0.00003
-0.02
Long Run -1.94 -0.04
(b) Probability of Being in Binge Short Run 0.029 0.0007
Drinking Group
0.002Long Run 0.066
(c). Probability ofBeing inNo Binge •Short Run 0.831 0.0193
Drinking Group
0.038Long Run 1.874
fin Hours Worked Short Run -0.026 -0.0006
long run -0.06 -0.001
fin Wage Short Run 0.007 0.0002
Long Run 0.016 0.0004
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APPENDIX A.:IMPUTATION^PROCEDURE TO COMPENSATE FOR MISSING
• . • rvr-r :RESPONSES^ ..
Item nonrfesponse in the survey occurs when.a sampled unit participates in the survey
but:fails to provide acceptable responses to one .o^ more survey questions. Item,non-response
mayarisebecause a respondent refuses to answer the question, does not know the answer to
the question, or gives an answer that is inconsistent with the answers to other questions. The
• ' 1'/ . , _ . ^ , V, •
compensation for item non-response is imputation involving assigninga value to the missing
response.
;We do not choose to delete observations; with missing data because it reduces the,
sample size substantially. The imputation methods for our data combine the hierarchical hot-
deck imputation and the deterministic-regression imputation. Imputations are performed on
the following variables: net family income, annual wage income, marital status, occupations,
and AFQT percentile.
. The procedures'of"hierarchical-hot,deck imputation" are as follows: First, the
auxiliary variables (gender, race, age,' etc.),areused to divide the sample into a set of classes
and then the imputation, is performed.within,the classes, .Themore auxiliary variables used,
the more homogeneous peoplebecome iii eachr class; Missing data are assigned values from
therespondents in thesame class. All survey,records are.diyidedrinto respondent records and
non-respondent records-within each imputation class. Respondent records are randomljj
selected to replace non^respondent records. Generally,.selecting donors by simple random
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sampling "without replacement is-preferred to sampling with replacement because sampling
without replacement minimizes the multiple use ofdonors. Deterministic regression
imputation simply replaces the missing value with the predicted value from the regression.
Although often'used, deterministic regression imputation,has -the,disadvantage ofdistorting
the distribution because the predicted vMues are actually mean values.
Imputation isperformed annually and, within each year, gender, race/employment
status and age are four mdn auxiliary variables used to form imputation classes. Race
contains three categories-black, Hispanic, and others. Age includes two groups— young
cohort and older cohort.' The medium age in 1979 is chosen as the dividing age, which is 17.
Annual wage income and family income have the highest rate ofitem non-response.
We defined nonwage income as the difference between net family income and wage income.
We chose regression imputations to compensate missing values in annual family income and
wage income because ofhigh percentage ofmissing values in these income variables. The
entire sample is grouped into employed and unemployed groups.'-To minimize the occurrence
ofundesirable results, e.g., wage income is greater than'annual family income, we regressed
nonwage income and wage income, rather-than faniily income and wage income. As aresult,
'missing family income can be computed directly'by adding hofiwage income to-wages income.
The explanatory variables for'annual wage income irlclude age, age square gender,, race,
region of residence, education, marital status, urban, AFQT percentile, and occupations. For
nonwage income, the explanatory variables comprise all the variablesin wage income
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equation, and the number ofchildren less than five years old, and delinquency problems
reported in 1980 survey. Wecontrol for selection bias byusing Heckman's (1976) approach.
Missing education is handled by the carry-over method. When a respondent has a
missing value for education in yeart, themissing value is replaced with the educational
I . ,
achievement reported by the same respondent inyear t-1. If education ismissing for twoor
moreconsecutive years, the latest education reported in the pastwill be used to substitute for
consecutive missing education.
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APPENDIX B. SOLUTIONS TO THE THIRD-ORDER DIFFiERENCEEQUATIONS
The simultaneous system canbe represented as:
(27) H, =aC, + bC._,+dL^+X,.
(28) C, = eH^ +fH._, + + iC,„ + jC.., +kL... +mL, + nL,., +X,
(29) L. = oH. + qC. + rC._. + sW. +X,.
(30) W, =yH,+hC,+X^ ,
where Lt is labor supply at period t,
Wt is wage rate at period t,
Ht is health status at period t,
Ct isbinge drinking at period t, and
Xii, i=l, 2, 3, 4 is sum oftheexogenous variables.
Substituting (29) into (30) and rearranging terms, we can obtain the following equation.
(31) L( =(o +sy)H( +(q +sh)Ct +rC,_, +(3X4^ +X3J
Using Equation (27), Equation (31) can be further simplified as afunction ofX's and C's.
(32) =(o+sy)[aCt +bC(., +dL( +X,t]+(q +sh)C( +rC(_, +(5X4^ +X3t)
=(q +sh +ao +asy)Ci +(r +bo +bsy)Cj.i +(do+dsy)Lj +(0+ sy)Xn
+ sXij + Xjt
(q +sh +ao+asy)^ , (r +bo+bsy)^
' (1-do-dsy) ' (1-do-dsy) ** (1-do-dsy)
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where u=
+ ? X. + — X,,
(1- do - dsy) (1- do- dsy)
= uCt + vCj.j + + oXji + Tpi^t
(q + sh + ao + asy)
(1-do-dsy)
(r + bo + bsy)
(1-do-dsy)
(o + sy)
(1- do -dsy)•
v=
S =
a = , and
(1-do-dsy)
1
V = (1-do-dsy)
Let L be.the lag operator defined by
(34) L%=Xt-„ for n=..., -2, -l/o, 1, X .... .
Ifn<0, the effect of multiplying Xt by^L" will be to shiftX forward in timeby -n periods.
Multiplying both sides ofEquation (33) by,L\and L'^ respectively,,we can obtain the labor
supply equation at period t-I and t+1.
(35) L,., = uC,., + vC,., + SC„., + oX.., + .
(36) L,.,=uC,.,+vC-+<5X.,.,+oX..,+^.,., .
Substitute Equation (3.5) into Equation (27) to get the demand equation.for health at period t
in terms of the demand for binge drinking and other exogenous variables:
(37) H, =aC, +bC,., +d(uC, +vC,_, +5K,, +^<jX^+?jX,^) +X,^
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= (a+du)C( +(b+dv)Ct_, +(l +5i)X,( +ddX^ +d?]X^^
The demand for health at period t-1 is obtained by applying lag operator onEquation (37)
(38) H,_. = (a+ du)C._, +(b+ dv)C._, + (1 +5i)X,._. + doX,_, + d^X,.,.
To solve for the reduced form for the demand for binge drinking, we use Equations (35), (36),
(37), (38), and (28). The resulting demand equation for binge drinking is a third-order
difference equation:
(39) C, =e[(a+du)C, +(b+dv)C,_, +(l +^Xi)X„ +doX,, +<irjX,^]
+f[(a +du)Ct,i +(b+dv)Ct_2 +(l +^)Xit., +d<TX^_^ +d7?A'3(_,]
+k[uCt^, +vC( +(5Xn^i +0X41^1 + ]
+m[uC( +vCj,i+0X4^+77X3(]
+ n[uCj., + vCt.2 +0X41., +7^3M]"^^2t
= (g+ ku)Ct+, + (ea+ edu +kv+mu)Cj
+(eb +edv +fa +fdu +i+mv +nu)Cj_i +(fb +fdv +-j +hv)Ct.2
+ + (e+e^ +m(y)X,t + (f + f(5d + n(y)X,(.,
+ k77X3(^, + (ed^+m7)X3t +(fd;? + n7)X3i_,
+koX4.^.,+(edcr +mcr)X4t+(fdo-Tf-na-)X4(.,+X21 .
Rearranging tenns. Equation (39) can be presented as the-following.
(40)
n-ea.edu-kv-mu) ^ (eb+ edv+ fa+fdu+ i+mv+ nu) ^
(fb +fdv +j+nv)^ kS ^ (e+e&i +tp^)^
(iTtal) -''(g+ku) (g+ku) • "
(f +f<5d +n<5)Y k7 ^ . (ed77 +m;7) (fd;y +n7)y
(g+ku) ""'"(g+ku) (g+ku) " (g+ku)
kc7 . (edg- +mo-)y (fd(T +no-)y 1
"(g+ku) (g+ku) * (g+ku) (g+ku)
=z,C,+Z2C,.i+Z3C...+P(t+l) .
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(1 - ea - edu - kv - mu)
where zi=—
Z2=-
(g + ku)
(eb + edy + fa + fdu.+ i + mv.+ nu)
(g + ku)
(fb + fdv + j + nv)
Z3=- . . , and
(g + ku)
T,/. V (e + e&i+ m<y)^ (f + f<Sl + n^)^
(g + ku) , (g + ku)
k7j ^ (Qdij + mrj)^ " (fd//+,n77) ^
"••^31+1 n ^ -^31 / , I \ -^31-1(g + ku) (g + ku) (g + ku)
. ko- ^ (edcr + mo;)^ (fdo-+ ncr)^ . 1 ^
(g+ ku) (g+ ku)~ ^ (g+ ku) (g+ ku)
Because of the multicollinearity, the empirical estimation does not include lead and lag
• ,Kj • .
dependent variables in the structural equations except lead and lag occasions ofbinge
drinking. To be consistent with the empirical analysis, the coefficients of one-year lead ^d
lag ofhealth capital, hours worked, and two-year lag ofoccasions of binge drinking are set to
equal zero in the following derivation. This implies that f, j,.k; n, and r are zeros.-. Applying
the lag operator on both sides ofEquation (40), we can get the third-order difference equation
. .1' I'
(41) C, =z,C.,+z,C..,+P(t) :
Solution to the Second-order DifTerence Equation
Usmg the lag operator, we canwrite Equation (41) as
(42) (l-z,L-z,L^)C, =P(t)
I
A solution to this difference equation isgiven by ; <
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It is convenient to write the polynomial 1- z,L - ZjL" in an alternative way,
(44) 1-z,L-z^V = (1-A,L)(l- A^L)
= l-(A,+>l2)L+>l,/^L' ,
so that A^+A2 =Zj,and A^A2=^Z2. and can be obtained from the following relation
(45) (l-A,xXl-A,x)=A,A,(j-'x)(^-x) .
Ifwe setEquation (45) equal to zero, then theequation is satisfied at the two roots x =—
and X=— Therefore the two roots ofx are found from solving the following characteristic
equation and and are the reciprocals of these two roots.
. l-ZjX-ZjX^ =0 •
Assuming that write the general solution to the second-order difference
equation as
where wi and W2 are any constants which can be found by using two side conditions. Note
that
1 k, k,
+
{\-A,-L)(\-A,L) (1-AL) (l-;i,^)
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where k, = — — and
- k =—^ -• •'•.••.-'•-•
' (^-^) •
Then Equation (46) can be rewritten as
Furthermore, we know that
' ' ' , i- \ ' "• c I ' •. • . •.
(48) —5 =1 +AL +XV+....
^ ^ (1-AL) . :
=.iL-'-(VL-^-(i)^L-^-
X X X . • .
The estimated structural coefficients are used to compute two roots, \ and ^ . The results
show that both roots are real and \ isgreater than'one and'^ are less than 1. Using
Equations (47) and (48),-we can-write the general solution to the third-order difference
equation as -.j
00 CO
(49) c.=-k,2:;i,-'P(t +j)+kjX4'P(t:-j)+,w,a:+w,
y=i /=o u , ,
where Wi and W2are the unknown constants,'which can be found by two side conditions, one
initial condition andone terminal condition. The initial condition includes the consumption
levelat period 0, Co. The terminal condition'reqiiifes that the marginal value of the addiction
stock goes to zero'when t approaches infinity;-^ The stock equation'is defined as: • .
(50) S...=C.+(l-;r)S. ,
57
where S is the addiction stockandn is the exogenous depreciation rate of the addiction stock.
Since the current model assumes that the depreciation rate of the addiction stock is equal to
one, the addiction stock at period t is just the consumption level at period t-1. This terminal
condition can be presented as the following:
(51) lim-^%^ =lim[w,- '^"'ln(^) +W2 '^"'ln(-^)] =0
For Equation (51) to hold, wi must be zero because A, is greater than one and is less than
1. By applying the initial conditions, W2 can be obtained from solving Equation (52) and the
results are presented in equation (53);
(52) C„=-k,2V'P« +k2P(0) +w, .
J=1
00
(53) w, =C„ +k,XV'PO)-P(0)k2 :
'j=l
The solutions to the demand for health, labor supply, and wage equations can therefore be
solved accordingly, given the solution to the demand for binge drinking.
Short Run Price Elasticity and LongRun PriceElasticity
Equation (49) determines the sign' and magnitude of the effects ofchanges in the
government policy variables, such as alcohol price and minimum legal drinking age, in period
;t on binge drinking, health status, labor supply, and wage in penod t. These effects are
temporary because the policy variables in other periods are held constant.
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(54)
dC.
dP.
(55)
dC.
dP.
T<X
(56)
dP.
11, 1-a+o,
where alhl is the estimated structural coefficient of alcohol price. The effect pn'binge drinking
in period t of a permanent change in alcohol price starting from period t can bederived, given
that Za' = -r
1 - a
(57)
(58)
^ =-(k.r'.zjalhl +(/L,'k,^-"""zjalhl
' r=t - ; . . ; . • •
alhl(z4) "^^-Cr-o j alhl(z4)A2
= -(k,>li"'zjalhl +i^\A,r:''z:^)aM ^
alhl(z,) alhKzjV
ll,
(A,->i,)(;i,-i) VW-^XX-i)
= -(k,>;ii"'zjalhl +(X'k,;ii- '^*'^ zJalhl -
f5^i± ="V— alh^z^) y . .(f.t)
rfp; dp^ "•^(A-X)^
alhl(zj / 2
1--^—^ t 1-]
^ 3 l-1>
1^ ^
alhlz
(A-i)
, (\-;i2)(A,-i)^ •
I . • 1
By setting t equal tol, the equation gives the effect on binge drinking at period t and period t-
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1ofan unanticipated permanent change in alcohol price starting from period t. Since
Equation (58) is equal to zero when t=l, the unanticipated price effect reduces to the
following.
(59)
dC.
d?:
(60) dC,,
dp;
unanticipated
Z4 alhl
(^-1)
=0
inatttici^ted
Equation (59) and (60) define the short run price effect as the effect on the consumption in
periods t and t-1 ofapermanent change in alcohol price beginning from period t, while past
consumption level is held constant. The short run effect on health status, labor supply, and
wage in period t ofan unanticipated permanent alcohol price change can be derived
♦
accordingly.
(62)
(63)
dL, dC, rfC,., dC,
dp: dp;
d?:
^ =y^+h^=yf(a+du)^+(b+dv)^
dP. dP. dP, . dP, dP, )
+ h
dp:
ciC
= (ya + ydu + h)—7
dP'
The short run price elasticity with respect to health status, binge dnnking, labor supply, and
wage is as follows.
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(64) .
(65) e * = P( CP ^F(c^)^;
//i£\ •
/^7\ - • _(67)
w, cfl>;
where and C^ are the latent values of health capital and occasions of binge drinking,
respectively, They are computed from the reduced form solutions of the simultaneous system,
which are evaluated at the mean values of relevant exogenous variables. Furthermore, f(-) and
F(-) are pdf and cdf ofstandardnormal distribution, respectively. Sincehealth and binge
drinking are binary and ordered dichotomous variables, the interpretation ofEquation (64)
and (65) is the price elasticitywith respect to the probability ofbeing healthy and the
! • .
probability ofhaving at least 5 occasions of binge drinking in the past 30 days,.respectlvely.
The-effect of a permanent change in.the, alcohol ipric.e in all periods on binge drinking
in period t is
dC * ®(68) ^ =-alhl(k,zj2A"' +alhl(k,z,)X/i,J +
j«l j=0
alhl(k,z,)2:'^ -^
The long run effect ofa permanent change in alcohol price is derived by setting t to infinity in
Equation (68). The last two terms in the equationwill approach zero when t goes to infinity
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because X2 is less than one. Equation (69) is the long run effect ofa permanent change in
alcohol price.
(69) ^=-aIhl(k,zj|;A,'+alhl(k,zJ2;V
or j=i j=o
^_alhl(k,z,)^aihi(k^Z4)
\ -1 I-^j
The long run price effect will be greater than the short run price effect because the
consumption level is allowed to change in all periods. At last, the long run effect on health
^ ^ ^ , r I ,
status, labor supply, and wage is
(70) ^ =(a+du)^+ (b+dv)
d? ^ . d9 . . d?
= (a + b + du+ dv)
(71) =u^+v^=(u+v)^ •.
^ ^ d? d? d? d?
' "The long run price elasticity with irespect to health status, binge drinking, labor supply,
and wage is
'F(H.) >.•
(74)
F(C.) dp;
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CTS') e " =^ ^ dP;
P. fAV.
(16) ^
w, dp;
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